"The first documented moves to claim and administer some of these far-flung islands took place during the early nineteenth century. The Spanish, as the colonial power in the Philippines, undertook occasional surveys of Scarborough Shoal from 1800 onward.Spain never made a formal declaration of sovereignty over the feature but included it on some maps as part of the Philippine archipelago. Emperor Gia Long, who founded the Nguyen Dynasty in Vietnam, declared sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in 1816. Prior to that, Vietnamese authorities had been officially sanctioning salvage operations in the islands for several decades. Vietnam continued to make occasional use of the islands during the 1830s and 1840s, after which official interest lapsed. In 1843,Captain Richard Spratly aboard the British whaler Cyrus claimed to be the first to discover the island that bears his name. Eventually the entire island group would come to be known as the Spratlys. The British East India Company had been conducting surveys of the islands from the late eighteenth century and in 1868, the British Admiralty compiled the results of those efforts into a new nautical chart of the South China Sea. That map displayed nine distinct islands and reefs in the western portion of thegrouping, including Spratly Island itself. In the east, it showed a largely empty expanse of water dotted with reefs whose existence could not be confirmed. The chart labeled this area "Dangerous Ground," a nickname it still bears. The map was revised in1881 and reproduced by nearly every country with an interest in the South China Sea, including the United States. It would remain the standard chart of the area until the 1950s. No government showed much interest in the islands themselves until 1877 whenthe British colonial authorities in Labuan, North Borneo registered a claim to Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay on behalf of London. Those two features were listed as possessions by the British Colonial Office from 1891 to 1933, though the British never vigorously pursued the claim. Despite later revisionism, Qing Dynasty documents and actions show that Chinese officials considered Hainan Island to be the southernmost limit of their authority. There is no record of any Chinese objections to Gia Long's annexation of the Paracels or subsequent Vietnamese activity there. When German and Japanese ships carrying insured British copper wrecked on the islands in 1895 and 1896, Chinese authorities foreswore any responsibility for them. Chinese fishers had salvagedthe wrecks, prompting the insurance company to demand compensation from those responsible. This was transmitted through the United Kingdom's embassy in Beijing and its consul in Hoihow (modern Haikou). In response, Chinese officials in Liangguang-supervising Guangxi and Guangdong provinces, including Hainan-insisted the islands were unclaimed as far as they were concerned"-- A robust yet accessible history of US involvement in the world's most dangerous waterway, and a guide for what to do about it.Lamentations that the United States is "losing" the South China Sea to China are now common. China has rapidly militarized islands and reefs, projects power across the disputed waterway, and freely harasses US allies and partners. The US has been unable to halt these processes or convince Beijing torespect the rights of smaller neighbors. But what exactly would "losing" mean? In On Dangerous Ground, Gregory B. Poling evaluates US interests in the world's most complex and dangerous maritime disputes by examining more than a century of American involvement in the South China Sea. He focuses on how the disputes there intersected and eventually intertwined with thelongstanding US commitment to freedom of the seas and its evolving alliance network in Asia. He shows that these abiding national interests--defense of maritime rights and commitment to allies, particularly the Philippines--have repeatedly pulled US attention to the South China Sea. Understandinghow and why is critical if the US and its allies hope to chart a course through the increasingly fraught disputes, while facing a more assertive, more capable, and far less compromising China. With an emphasis on decisions made not just in Washington and Beijing, but also in Manila and other Southeast Asian capitals, On Dangerous Ground seeks to correct the record and balance the China-centric narrative that has come to dominate the issue. It not only provides the most comprehensiveaccount yet of America's history in the South China Sea, but it also demonstrates how that history should inform US national security policy in one of the most important waterways in the world., 36

Общая информация o: "The first documented moves to claim and administer some of these far-flung islands took place during the early nineteenth century. The Spanish, as the colonial power in the Philippines, undertook occasional surveys of Scarborough Shoal from 1800 onward.Spain never made a formal declaration of sovereignty over the feature but included it on some maps as part of the Philippine archipelago. Emperor Gia Long, who founded the Nguyen Dynasty in Vietnam, declared sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in 1816. Prior to that, Vietnamese authorities had been officially sanctioning salvage operations in the islands for several decades. Vietnam continued to make occasional use of the islands during the 1830s and 1840s, after which official interest lapsed. In 1843,Captain Richard Spratly aboard the British whaler Cyrus claimed to be the first to discover the island that bears his name. Eventually the entire island group would come to be known as the Spratlys. The British East India Company had been conducting surveys of the islands from the late eighteenth century and in 1868, the British Admiralty compiled the results of those efforts into a new nautical chart of the South China Sea. That map displayed nine distinct islands and reefs in the western portion of thegrouping, including Spratly Island itself. In the east, it showed a largely empty expanse of water dotted with reefs whose existence could not be confirmed. The chart labeled this area "Dangerous Ground," a nickname it still bears. The map was revised in1881 and reproduced by nearly every country with an interest in the South China Sea, including the United States. It would remain the standard chart of the area until the 1950s. No government showed much interest in the islands themselves until 1877 whenthe British colonial authorities in Labuan, North Borneo registered a claim to Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay on behalf of London. Those two features were listed as possessions by the British Colonial Office from 1891 to 1933, though the British never vigorously pursued the claim. Despite later revisionism, Qing Dynasty documents and actions show that Chinese officials considered Hainan Island to be the southernmost limit of their authority. There is no record of any Chinese objections to Gia Long's annexation of the Paracels or subsequent Vietnamese activity there. When German and Japanese ships carrying insured British copper wrecked on the islands in 1895 and 1896, Chinese authorities foreswore any responsibility for them. Chinese fishers had salvagedthe wrecks, prompting the insurance company to demand compensation from those responsible. This was transmitted through the United Kingdom's embassy in Beijing and its consul in Hoihow (modern Haikou). In response, Chinese officials in Liangguang-supervising Guangxi and Guangdong provinces, including Hainan-insisted the islands were unclaimed as far as they were concerned"-- A robust yet accessible history of US involvement in the world's most dangerous waterway, and a guide for what to do about it.Lamentations that the United States is "losing" the South China Sea to China are now common. China has rapidly militarized islands and reefs, projects power across the disputed waterway, and freely harasses US allies and partners. The US has been unable to halt these processes or convince Beijing torespect the rights of smaller neighbors. But what exactly would "losing" mean? In On Dangerous Ground, Gregory B. Poling evaluates US interests in the world's most complex and dangerous maritime disputes by examining more than a century of American involvement in the South China Sea. He focuses on how the disputes there intersected and eventually intertwined with thelongstanding US commitment to freedom of the seas and its evolving alliance network in Asia. He shows that these abiding national interests--defense of maritime rights and commitment to allies, particularly the Philippines--have repeatedly pulled US attention to the South China Sea. Understandinghow and why is critical if the US and its allies hope to chart a course through the increasingly fraught disputes, while facing a more assertive, more capable, and far less compromising China. With an emphasis on decisions made not just in Washington and Beijing, but also in Manila and other Southeast Asian capitals, On Dangerous Ground seeks to correct the record and balance the China-centric narrative that has come to dominate the issue. It not only provides the most comprehensiveaccount yet of America's history in the South China Sea, but it also demonstrates how that history should inform US national security policy in one of the most important waterways in the world.